The International Group of Experts on Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulation

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International Biosecurity Mandates

- Biological Weapons Convention
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
Biological Weapons Convention

- First multilateral treaty banning the production of biological weapons
- Opened for signature April 10, 1972, became effective March 26, 1975
Biological Weapons Convention Article 1

"Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

- (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
- (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

- Adopted by unanimous consent of UNSC April 28, 2004
- Proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security
- Focus on prevention of WMD by non-state actors
- As of October 2013 all but 28 member states have submitted at least a first report on implementation
UNSCR 1540

Major Obligations

- To “refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” (Article 1)
- To “adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery”. (Article 2)
- To “take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery”. (Article 3)
International Group of Experts on Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulation

- Ad hoc group of representatives from national regulatory programs in biosafety/biosecurity
- Not an official organ of the U.N. or any national government
- Biennial meetings to discuss issues in the regulation of biological pathogens
IGEBBR History and Participants

- **Meetings:**
  - February 2007, Ottawa, Canada
  - May 2009, Bern, Switzerland
  - February 2011, Singapore
  - March 2013, Atlanta, USA

- **Participants from the following nations:**
  - Canada, U.S., Switzerland, The Netherlands, Germany, the U.K., Brazil, Singapore, Denmark, France, Japan, Australia
Objectives of the IGEBBR

- To act as the focus point for the development of an international network of Advisors in matters related to the regulation of Human Pathogen Biosafety and Biosecurity

- To benefit members through active discussion of current and emerging issues relating to Human Pathogen Biosafety and Biosecurity and to share best practices and lessons learned

- To benefit members through discussion and sharing of related programs, expertise, and approaches

- To encourage coordination among national regulators in order to ensure greater compatibility and interoperability of biosecurity and biosafety systems and processes

- To promote the development of effective biosafety and biosecurity regulation internationally including the building of capacity in fields such as inspections, risk assessment, safety measures, oversight mechanisms
# Components of National Regulatory Programs Participating in the 2013 IGEBBR Meeting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Agent List</th>
<th>Biosafety Req.</th>
<th>Biosecurity Requirements</th>
<th>Possession</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Incident Reporting</th>
<th>Dual Use Research of Concern</th>
<th>Genetic elements</th>
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*The Restricted Experiment Section of the HHS/USDA Select Agent Regulations requires the preauthorization of experiments designed to make select agents resistant to drugs used for their prevention or control.*
For more information please contact Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

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The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.